PLOX: A Secure Serverless Framework for the Smart Home by Friesen, Micheal
PLOX: A Secure Serverless




presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the




Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2021
c© Micheal Friesen 2021
Author’s Declaration
This thesis consists of material all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement
of Contributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any
required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
ii
Statement of Contributions
This thesis is based upon three different conference submissions to NSDI 2019, OSDI 2021
and NDSS 2022. The attached submission is therefore in part co-authored by myself, Ryan
Hancock, Ali Mashtizadeh, Omid Abari, and Yousra Aafer, all authors of the submissions
sent to these conferences.
The PLOX framework was designed together by myself and Ryan Hancock, under the su-
pervision of both Ali Mashtizadeh and Omid Abari. PLOX was developed by both Ryan
and I, with the source code and commit history available on the Reliable Computer Sys-
tems instance of Phabricator.
My development contributions to PLOX were focused on the manifest system, design and
development of the protocol used between devices, development of the converted smart
applications used in the evaluation and implementation/testing of the taint-based IFC
system. I was also responsible for the implementations of Amazon IoT Greengrass, Azure
IoT Edge and Home Assistant used to compare PLOX against other systems in the evalua-
tion. The background research used to create the comparisons between the available smart
hub frameworks and currently known vulnerabilities was also written and researched by
myself. My development efforts were in partnership with Ryan Hancock, who led the de-




Smart hubs play a key role in the modern smart home in executing code on behalf of
devices locally or on the cloud. Unfortunately, smart hubs are prone to security problems
due to misconfigurations, device over permissioning and network mismanagement. In this
work, I show the major vulnerabilities and attacks currently targeting smart hubs, and
provide a brief overview of the literature that addresses these issues. After discussing
the limitations found in the literature as well as the available off the shelf smart hubs, I
provide an overview of PLOX, an end-to-end approach designed to combat a large number
of the common vulnerabilities and security/privacy risks that impact smart hubs, while
maintaining a moderate overhead.
PLOX is designed to sandbox applications on the home WiFi router. This allows for
increased network controls, as well as lower latency in direct communication with devices.
PLOX provides a new hybrid security model that combines a mandatory access control
(MAC) system with information flow control (IFC), providing developer familiarity while
addressing the overtainting issue found within taint based IFC systems through a serverless
execution pattern. In our evaluations, PLOX outperforms Amazon Lambda by 500% and
an open source smart hub solution, Home Assistant, by 13%, all while providing finer
grained security policies and improved security guarantees. This is due to PLOX’s locality
and its light weight nature.
This work demonstrates that PLOX, an open source end-to-end solution for the smart
home is well suited to address a large number of the security and privacy problems that
the smart home suffers from. This work also highlights a number of novel approaches to
smart hub designs, including the use of the home router to maintain device isolation, and
combination of manifest and IFC based permission systems.
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Internet of Things (IoT) devices have continued to offer an increasing set of utilities and
features for the modern smart home. From security cameras to door locks, smart home
users have placed an increased amount of trust in the reliability and security of in home
smart devices. Competing against this trust are the ever-growing challenges that arise
from the variety of devices and device manufacturers. Each manufacturer has a different
set security standards and practices, leaving a growing number of consumers vulnerable to
data breaches and attacks. Numerous surveys have shown these risks along with privacy
concerns deter users from bringing smart devices into their home [49, 51].
Consider a simple security system that includes a camera with a video feed used for
face detection, a motion sensor to detect intruders, and a phone notification system. Each
of these devices have different degrees of data privacy requirements and data sensitivity.
Some tasks may require the use of cloud resources, while others are able to execute locally.
A security camera recording the garden may have substantially different privacy concerns
than a camera placed inside the home. Individual user permissions are varied between
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household residents and guests. Even in this simple example, there are numerous pos-
sible devices and communication paths in which user privacy and security could become
compromised. When expanded to include real-time operations such as emergency response
systems, or devices with tangible security implications in failure cases such as a smart lock,
the importance of addressing the litany of problems that can arise within this domain is
significant.
IoT devices are diverse but typically have limited on-board resources, requiring process-
ing to take place elsewhere. Cloud computing has been used extensively across the smart
home. Smart devices leverage a number of developer tools the cloud provides such as auto
scaling, serverless frameworks and remote firmware management to assist in smart home
deployments. Users are left with a plug and play experience that only requires devices to
be connected to the WiFi router. Despite these advantages, the cloud computing pattern
has led to security and privacy issues. First, device data leaves the home, allowing cloud
providers to store and process generated data, sacrificing privacy. These privacy issues are
especially concerning, given the sensitive data captured by devices such as security systems
and smart baby monitors.
Second, the lack of transparency in how devices are connected to each other can lead
to security problems. When each device uses a separate set of cloud services, security
mechanisms and privacy guarantees, attackers can take advantage of the least secured
device in the home to compromise the entire system [36, 66]. Smart home devices serve a
wide variety of responsibilities, each requiring a different degree of trust. Without a control
mechanism in place to prevent an over permissioned device from accessing a home security
system, users are left unable to proactively prevent misuse of their devices and data.
Furthermore, the reliance on cloud computation has led to total device unavailability
when network connection is lost. With the ever increasing reliance on connected devices,
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losing functionality of smart thermostats or smart locks can cause significant disruption
to the home. One such example caused users to be unable to use their vacuum or unlock
their doors due to an Amazon server failure [52].
Rather than use the cloud, many devices offload data processing to smart hubs, which
are local devices that perform computation. Smart hubs have desirable reliability [52] and
privacy properties due to their locality and continue to function in the case of an internet
outage.
Samsung SmartThings [60], Apple Homekit [1] and Home Assistant [2] are a small sub-
set of the growing number of solutions used that follow this model. A central point of
computation provides a range of tools that orchestrate the connection and communication
of data among smart devices, while managing device state and controlling device interac-
tions. Smart hubs often mix the use of cloud resources and edge computing to minimize
device functionality in network failure and run larger computational tasks on the cloud
to minimize strain on the rest of the devices. A growing number of platforms that fol-
low this model also allow third-party “smart applications”, software that can connect and
control devices within the home that can be downloaded by home users through a mar-
ketplace. These third party applications help provide extensibility for developers to use
and control the smart device data and sensors in novel ways. Unfortunately, these third
party smart apps provide further possibilities for poorly written or malicious applications
to compromise the security and privacy of the smart home.
A number of open source solutions, including Home Assistant [2] and OpenHAB [55],
have been developed to increase reliability, user privacy and user control over the smart
home. Both offload to a local compute node for most tasks, only using cloud when nec-
essary. Each have a focus on increasing the privacy of user data through ratings of smart
applications and extensions to the home deployments, highlighting how properly config-
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ured the smart applications are. Unfortunately, both OpenHAB and Home Assistant are
developer-centric frameworks that are challenging for home users to properly configure.
For example, to properly isolate devices, Home Assistant requires the configuration of lo-
cal subnets within the network, a task that non-technical users are unlikely to perform.
Also, to enable encryption for device communication, an extension must be enabled and
configured, forcing users to provide certificates and execute numerous shell commands,
rather than being enabled by default in platforms like Apple Homekit.
1.1 Smart Home threats
Malicious attacks against IoT devices are becoming more prevalent and sophisticated. 32%
of all observed attacks in 2020 were against IoT devices, a 13% increase from 2019 [54].
Cybercriminals are intensifying their efforts by exploiting the weak security practices in
the IoT ecosystem. Manufacturers often default leave factory known passwords on de-
vices [7, 16], and use unencrypted communications to share sensitive user credentials
between devices [42]. Out of date firmware leaves devices prone to exploitation by bot-
nets [11, 63, 5] and open communication protocols can be exploited leading to the execution
of malicious code [14, 53]. Cloud providers have also mistakenly exposed sensitive user data
through public endpoints, leading to data privacy concerns. [8, 9, 30, 31, 64, 26].
Addressing these security issues is difficult as the IoT ecosystem is complex. First, IoT
devices are heterogeneous ranging from low powered sensors to sophisticated smart hubs.
Second, the lack of transparency into inter-device communication has previously forced
users to rely on manufacturers and developers to configure and secure their devices. Unfor-
tunately, manufacturers and developers do not posses the required context to understand
how users are using each device and what data is considered sensitive. This lack of context
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has been shown to leave devices over-permissioned [44, 65, 57], leading to data leaks and
privacy violations. This lack of ownership of user data is listed as one of the top issues by
The Open Web Application Security Project. (OWASP) [15].
Smart hubs run third party applications in the home which necessitates the use of
sandboxing to provide application isolation. However, popular sandboxing tools [50, 18, 3]
are complex with difficult to configure security models, which are incomprehensible to
users and difficult for developers [37]. Sandbox tools also lack context on the sensitivity
of user data and are unable to the prevent the leaking of this data to external sources.
Further, these sandboxing tools cannot address communications occurring outside of the
sandbox environment as they lack pertaining context on how devices are communicating.
For example, in the IoT ecosystem, devices communication rules may be dynamic but
sandbox permissions and the objects they are tied to are static on creation.
The research community has proposed various solutions to address IoT security issues.
Unfortunately, current solutions fall short because of the heterogeneity of IoT devices, and
the opaque and complex inter-device communication model. Particularly, monitoring solu-
tions rely on communication and external resource monitoring [38, 22, 62] like application
code updates but require knowledge about IoT protocols to correctly recognize anomalous
behavior. In practice, reverse engineering closed communications protocols is challenging
and brittle in the face of future updates.
Other solutions improve user comprehension by better informing the user on what
resources each device needs access to [44, 65, 46]. This requires developers to modify code
to include code annotations to generate better prompts to the user. While this process can
help reduce over-permission problems, they do not prevent devices from being attacked in
the smart home. Additionally, if these user comprehension strategies influence the design
of the permission system, the permissions can become coarse grained in an attempt to be
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understandable to users, leading to further over-permissioning problems [44, 37].
1.2 PLOX
We present PLOX, a novel smart hub IoT framework that exposes a fine grained permission
API to developers with comprehensible privacy controls for users. These permissions are
enforced across IoT devices and applications running on PLOX. PLOX runs on the home
router and isolates each IoT device while tracking sensitive data as it moves throughout the
home to ensure it is never leaked to an untrusted external entity. The router is already a
trusted device that arbitrates all communication between IoT devices, making it a natural
place for operating on sensitive data.
PLOX introduces a novel hybrid security model that combines capability-based sand-
boxing (based on Capsicum [67]) with information flow control (IFC) [33, 59, 68, 28, 34].
Capabilities provide the fine-grained security policies for developers to limit and secure
their application on the smart hub, while IFC is used to define user policy and dynami-
cally remove permissions as an application accesses sensitive data.
A key insight is our observation that IFC and capability systems share much in common,
and IFC systems only require the ability to revoke capabilities. Both models require similar
interposition into system calls and control over file descriptors and other OS resources.
We can apply both capability and IFC policies to our sandbox framework with a small
modification to our system. IFC adds a modest overhead to only the resources protected
by IFC.
PLOX developers use a serverless microservices architecture to achieve privilege sepa-
ration [47, 56]. Applications are constructed as a combination of short stateless functions
6
that that can invoke one another. PLOX avoids overtainting problems common to IFC
systems by restarting each stateless function after each invocation, allowing the runtime
to reset all IFC labels and clear all process data.
This thesis makes the following contributions:
• A novel hybrid IFC/capability security model, called the Dynamic Capability model,
that allows fine grained control over applications and user data. By using a serverless
architecture for applications, we avoid the overtainting of processes due to IFC.
• PLOX’s use of the router as a smart hub device, allowing for the proper restriction
of device to device communication and isolation of devices.
• We evaluate the PLOX IoT framework and give a detailed outline of how PLOX
defends against attack in the IoT ecosystem and show the low overhead of the hybrid
security model on resource constrained devices.
We implemented a prototype of PLOX on FreeBSD 12.1, and evaluated it from several
metrics. First, we simulated popular attacks in the IoT ecosystem (i.e., remote botnet
and sensitive data leaks). Our experiments show that PLOX is effective in thwarting
them in practice. Second, we evaluated PLOX’s performance against Amazon Lambda
and Home Assistant, a popular open source smart-hub framework. Our results show that
PLOX outperforms both frameworks in round-trip time, demonstrating the feasibility of




In this chapter, we examine the causes behind the security and privacy vulnerabilities
within the IoT ecosystem which motivates PLOX’s design and give an overview of capability
systems and IFC systems.
2.1 Security Issues
Table 2.1 shows a comparison of current state-of-the-art research solutions and the security
vulnerabilities they protect against. We classify the problems broadly under three cate-
gories: configuration, open communication, and untrusted third-party application code for
smart hubs.
Configuration Configuration vulnerabilities in IoT devices occur when manufacturers
adopt insecure default configurations (e.g., static factory device credentials). Permission-
based systems on IoT devices are also prone to misconfigurations when developers cannot
8
Security Concern SmartThings Home Assistant HomeKit Flowfence ContexIot HAWatcher PLOX
Configuration
Weak Authentications X X
Default Configurations X X
Open Communications
Encrypted Communication X X X X X
Event Eavesdropping X X X X
Event Spoofing X X X X
Third Party Applications
Coarse Grained Permissions X X X X
Data Locality X X X
Data Ownership X X X
Table 2.1: Comparison of solutions designed to address the security and privacy concerns
of the smart home.
determine the minimal set of capabilities/permissions required to run correctly, often lead-
ing to overpermissioning.
Fundamentally, overpermissioning is caused by inherent limitations in current permis-
sion/capability systems; they require specific knowledge around systems calls and network
interfaces [50, 3, 18], and often lack the granularity required for a correct execution of code
(e.g., AppArmor [50] lacks fine-grained network controls). These systems also lack context
around user policy and are far too complex for an average (non-technical) user to configure.
Open Communication Open protocols like MQTT [20] allow an adversary to interact
with all devices (using event eavesdropping/spoofing) within the home, as many of these
event systems are completely open to all connected devices. This enables adversaries to
use a weakly secured device (using the configuration issues outlined above) to attack the
entire system. For example, attackers were able to use a fish tank monitor to gain access
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to a casino’s database [13] and steal sensitive data through the fish monitor itself.
Other attacks like botnets [11] focus on exploiting the configuration issues outlined
above to compromise any of the IoT devices that are externally reachable. Using weak
authentication as a result from default configurations, attackers turn victim devices into
remotely controlled bots with the purpose of later using them to perform various attacks,
including distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, email spamming [53], and power
grid attacks [63]. All these attacks exploit a lack of monitored communication between
devices within the home. Other attacks such as those done on smart locks [42] exploits
unencrypted communications to steal user credentials.
Third-Party Application Code The diversity of IoT devices on the market has lead
to a variety of applications being run on smart hub, as well as a range of firmware versions
on each device. Proper sandboxing of third-party applications is difficult due to the need
to enforce policy on sensitive data (data ownership) while also restricting the functionality
in the sandbox itself. Sandboxing techniques that have been used [4, 18, 3, 50] are too
coarse-grained, thus often lead to overpermissioning.
Legislation has been proposed or passed in the UK [32] and California [21] to regulate
default configurations and unpatched firmware issues, requiring manufactures to abide by
a specified level of security standards. However, there are still major issues in properly
executing third-party applications while upholding user data policies. Capture [22] is a
novel solution used to handle the deployment and management of device firmware and
third-party libraries. However, it only focuses on this issue and as such does not defend
against poorly configured devices or overpermission issues.
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2.2 Security Models
Capability/Permission Systems Capability systems are rule-based security systems
that outline what a program is allowed to do. Often these systems require the use of
manifests to outline these permissions [40]. Singularity [43] is an example system that uses
manifest based programs to enforce the rule set created by the developer. As such these
manifest-based systems are often used to create sandboxes to isolate each program [4, 50,
18, 3, 45]. Current sandbox systems suffer from coarse granularity of these permissions.
Even the fine-grained permission systems are prone to misconfiguration which can lead to
applications being exploited [41].
FreeBSD’s Capsicum [67] is a capability sandbox that ties capabilities to file descriptors.
Once a process enters capsicum mode it may only use the permissions given on the current
file descriptors open. Processes are limited in the ways they can create new file descriptors.
For example to open a file it requires the use of the openat system call with a relative
parent file descriptor given the CAP LOOKUP capability. The opened file descriptor can only
have a subset of the rights currently given to the parent used to create it.
System calls that don’t require a relative file descriptor are prohibited such as open or
getcwd. This makes creating sandboxes for third party applications difficult due to the
need to support these system calls in safe ways. To do this, the need for a system call
interposition layer is required to translate system calls to a secure version. When additional
file descriptors are required, a secure daemon process is needed to pass new file descriptors
to this process. This sandboxing technique allows us to avoid many of the security flaws
that can occur with system call interposition. However, once these file descriptors are given
its difficult to revoke these file descriptors or permissions on them.
11
Information Flow Control IFC systems are a restrictive based security model which
tracks the communication between processes, ”tainting” them based off of how they read
or write as this occurs. Tainting objects is the process of labeling an object with a unique
identifier and category of taint. Operations that cause data to flow between two tainted
objects causes the processes reading the data to gain the label of the writer.
This taint is accumulated and spread to other processes as it runs, restricting func-
tionality as it moves through the system. Systems that use an information flow control
model [34, 68, 28, 35, 37, 69, 48] often suffer from ”overtainting” in which devices or ap-
plications become so tainted that they can no longer communicate with other entities on





We assume that an attacker may use any external means to gain complete control of an
IoT device. This can be through adversarial code deployment, using poorly configured
security permissions, or attempting to communicate through weakly secured devices. This
device cannot be the router itself as we assume this is a fully trusted device that has been
properly configured. Once a device on the home network has become compromised, the
attacker should be unable to:
1. Communicate with any device or service within the home that it is not specifically
allowed in the manifest. This communication cannot be sent through the provided
PLOX event system or directly through the network.
2. Send sensitive data outside the IoT network, even if the network endpoints themselves
are allowed. If an endpoint is given trust to handle a device’s sensitive data by an
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administrator, only that device’s sensitive data can be leaked. Further, an attack
should be unable to pipe sensitive data to another device to be sent to an external
source.
Out of scope of our threat model is the leakage of sensitive data or usage through
external endpoints already deemed trustful by the user, or sensitive data located outside
the network. Also attacks that involve overpermissioning by the developer to DDoS devices
within the home using accepted events (this can be mitigated however). Side channel
attacks that focus on timings throughout the PLOX system or attacks requiring physical
acquisition or close proximity to the device [58] are also out of scope.
3.2 Design Overview
PLOX is a secure smart hub framework that enforces user policy around sensitive data
through its use of the serverless paradigm to support privilege separation of IoT applica-
tions. PLOX uses its full view of the IoT ecosystem (due to its placement on the router) to
mitigate or completely stop various attacks in it. This full view also allows PLOX to have
context of data normally not seen by other solutions, allowing to display risk style ques-
tions [57, 44] to its users to configure devices which has been shown to be more effective
for non-technical users.
Processes within the restricted capability mode of Capsicum are restricted from doing
most system calls, and can only make calls using the file descriptors they have open.
Capsicum can be challenging to use for 3rd party, off the shelf software, as such software
assumes access to standard system calls. For example, the Python interpreter heavily relies
on getcwd and dlopen when importing new modules.
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Figure 3.1: The basic architecture of PLOX.
PLOX overcomes this using its system call interposition layer, which also acts as the
main abstraction to enforce IFC. This abstraction allows PLOX to run nearly unmodified
third party C/C++ or Python code. We define the functions provided and their execution
runtimes using a commonly used term – ”lambdas”.
PLOX uses a manifest [40, 43] to allow developers to describe the resources needed
by the application. The manifest outlines the functionality of each lambda through the
files, network endpoints and general system call usage needed during the execution of
the lambda(§ 3.10.1). PLOX provides a ”yell” mode for developers that identifies all
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permissions required when testing the application and generates a manifest.
As shown in Figure 3.1 PLOX consists of four main components: the PLOX service,
PLOX runtime, PLOX interposition layer, and the PLOX lambda.
• PLOX Service: The PLOX service interfaces directly with devices, handling all
requests and messages. It is responsible for instantiating, scheduling and caching
lambdas. Users interact with the service to manage access control for each device.
• PLOX Runtime: Manages the sandbox and provides runtime services for the PLOX
interposition layer. This includes system calls that open new resources, e.g. open and
connect. The runtime creates capabilities as needed that are allowed in the manifest
and enforces user policy on sensitive data.
• PLOX Interposition Layer: The interposition layer (or shim) that redirects sys-
tem calls and some libc functions. This layer translates system call requests to IPC
and directly communicates with the PLOX runtime and uses the runtime to complete
specific system calls.
• PLOX Lambda: Runs code belonging to an IoT device as defined by its previously
approved and installed manifest. It runs on top of the shim which translates system
calls to runtime requests to provide a more compatibility for existing third party




PLOX enables wireless client isolation to restrict communication exclusively between the
device and the WiFi router, disabling all other communications. Adding a devices requires
user approval to pair the device by generating and installing TLS certificates on the device.
The user also chooses a sensitivity label for device’s data. PLOX uses TLS to encrypt
communications between PLOX and device. It uses TLS client authentication to allow
both PLOX and device verify each other’s identify on all subsequent connections.
In this section we outline the main components of the PLOX system and its client. We
introduce the interposition layer (shim), which is used to translate system calls to inter-
process communications (IPC) to the PLOX runtime. The PLOX runtime administers the
policy dictated by both the manifest of the application, as well as enforces user IFC policy
throughout the system. We also describe the PLOX service, responsible for orchestrating
the system, scheduling resources, providing an interface for external control, and providing
end users controls.
As an example of a simple application when illustrating how our components work,
we illustrate a security camera which notifies a user when a face is detected, the camera
also allows for a user to rotate it even when they are outside the network. Listing 3.2
and 3.1 shows an example of the manifest and code in reference to this application, while
Figure 3.2 diagrams how communication is delegated in the system. The overall view of
how the components interact can be seen in Figure 3.1.
17
3.4 PLOX Client
The client library is used by IoT devices to communicate with the PLOX service to perform
the initial device pairing, and send requests to be run on the server itself. Once the
connection is created with the server, the device and PLOX service mutually authenticate
one another and the client begins by firstly ensuring associated code (Listing 3.1) and
manifest (Listing 3.2) are present on the system, one done the device listen for the events
it is subscribed to along this channel. It is through these events that devices both receive
information or requests and can become tainted.
Device taint can be mitigated through two options: proper restriction of device capabil-
ities via the manifest, avoiding events (and data) that would cause tainting through the use
of a ”cloud needed” option. This option restricts sensitive data flowing to this component
outlined in the manifest. On device installation PLOX prompts the user on whether this
device should be considered sensitive before any communication or execution is allowed.
3.5 PLOX Service
The PLOX service runs on the router and can restrict the lambdas’ memory usage through
calls to limits and rctl or pin lambdas to specific cores through calls to cpuset. This can
be useful, as PLOX may want to keep a dedicated core open for router traffic. The PLOX
services manifest dictates the root policy that will be taken by future lambdas that use
the PLOX Service, allowing for coarser grain policy over these lambdas if needed.
Once the initial handshake and necessary files are transferred to the router, the PLOX
service begins the initialization of the lambda. To allow for communication and remote
procedural calls (RPCs) between the lambda process and the main service a socket pair is
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created. This channel acts as the main way for delivering and servicing requests from the
PLOX Runtime.
A working directory is created for the child to act as its root directory. This directory
will act as the only location a lambda may read or write to unless specified and approved
in its manifest. Specific directories can be allowed by the PLOX service (e.g. library
directories for dynamic linking) when required.
Before forking, the library of the lambda is opened (but not read) so that the lambda
may have access to the open file descriptor. The PLOX service then forks and cleans
up memory and restricts previously opened file descriptors (e.g. library file descriptors).
The lambda enters capsicum mode and performs necessary bootstrapping for the language
runtime and blocks on the channel to wait for its first event.
Reverse HTTP Service To handle external services that interact with internal devices,
we use the devices manifest and keep a long running connection open to the outlined
endpoints. These services send requests through this channel and trigger functions within
the PLOX framework through allowed events. Using the example of Figure 3.2, a user
wishing to move a camera through their cloud provider sends an event to the long running
connection previously opened by the PLOX service. The endpoint sends a ”camera/move”
event to the system which is passed through to the camera.
External endpoints are not limited to interacting with just devices as they are able
to publish events to the event bus. Through the publication of these events, external
endpoints can spawn lambdas defined in their application manifest (as long as they are
properly subscribed to them). This is important when working with sensitive data, as it
allows for an external entity to ask for computation to be done on sensitive internal data
without becoming tainted itself (as communication flows one way).
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Event Queues All lambdas have the ability to publish and subscribe to custom events of
the PLOX service. When a device first registers itself with the PLOX service, its identifier
is placed into the event queues that it wishes to be subscribed to. The event queues are
organized by device and event type. When an event is fired by a running lambda, any
relevant payload data is copied out, and placed within an event structure, which holds
identifying information of the publisher. Events can be executed in two domains, either
on the physical IoT device itself or through its associated serverless function. We allow
physical devices to run their own events as this is crucial in getting the functionality that
is required by them (such as taking a picture).
3.6 PLOX Runtime
The PLOX runtime supports the needs of the running lambda and provides APIs to receive
and respond to events while also acting as the filter for received system call requests. We
avoid the major pitfalls of security systems based on system call interposition, as described
by Garfinkel [39], by following two design rules. First, all lambdas are single threaded and
disallow forking. This eliminates many race conditions present with using other techniques
including ptrace() and Seccomp [17].
Second, we use Capsicum’s limiting of file descriptor privileges to implement finer grain
policy and hand descriptors back to the sandboxed process. This avoids the need to
replicate internal operating system state that is challenging to do and source of security
problems, which is needed when interposing on all operations.
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3.7 PLOX Shim Layer
Each lambda converts system calls and other API calls to RPC to the PLOX runtime
using the interposition layer. These requests are made over a socket pair that is established
between the two processes on creation of the lambda. The runtime replies with the results,
and may transfer file descriptors that adds capabilities to the sandbox. The PLOX runtime
allows or denies calls based on the manifest file and the list of user approved permissions.
The user is responsible for approving the specified permissions outlined in the manifest,
but this process can be seen similarly to how users approve applications on their phone. If
a lambda ever attempts to execute outside of their specified permissions the operation fails.
As described earlier, one of the major pitfalls of Capsicum is its inability to run unmodified
code. The PLOX shim is what supports this conversion, for example it supports turning
open calls into openat calls with the dedicated root directory for the lambda being used
as its argument. If absolute paths are used then an RPC is sent and the PLOX runtime
filters this request based on the manifest sent with the application.
Curl as an example, must be given access to not only the file that describes nameservers,
but also be given permission to access the specific IPs of these nameservers. Curl also
requires cryptography libraries which must be defined and loaded by the service itself.
PLOX exposes much of the inner workings of these libraries by showing exactly what files,
connections and resources these applications require.
Enforcing Information Flow Control To enforce that data remains within the house-
hold, PLOX specially handles sockets that are created within the lambda. We cannot hand
real connected sockets to lambdas as there is a possibility that a lambda opens a connec-
tion to an allowed host or IP, then opens a tainted file or attempts to communicate with
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a sensitive service, this opens up the opportunity sensitive data to be sent through the
opened channel. With the standard usage of capsicum we would be unable to stop the
running lambda from using the connected socket as we had already handed it over.
To handle these cases PLOX has to take special care of sockets by firstly interposing on
the socket based system calls like socket, bind, listen, accept, getsockopt, setsockopt,
etc. PLOX starts by intercepting the socket creation call, registering that socket to a
structure similar to a file descriptor table associated to that specific lambda. PLOX hands
one end of a socket pair to the lambda rather than the socket itself.
When specified operations are called (e.g. connect) these operations are performed on
the internally registered file descriptor that the runtime holds. This allows PLOX to have
full control over this socket and the data that is sent between the lambda and the other
connected service. PLOX can completely block communication upon seeing the device
becoming tainted. Applications that try to bypass this (e.g., using the syscall function)
service are never allowed to connect to anything as these permissions are never given to
the process.
3.8 PLOX Developer API
We expose a special function sendEvent, which allows devices or lambdas to publish events
to the system (Listing 3.1), it was important to minimally expose functionality in code to
keep the code simple and closely resemble a deployment on Amazon Lambda [61].
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Listing 3.1: Sample Python lambda which makes a call to an external API
from r e q u e s t s import put
import j s on
# I n t e r n a l Camera A p p l i c a t i o n Code
def n o t i f y ( arguments , sendEvent ) :
r eque s t = put ( ” http :// api . n o t i f i c a t i o n . com” ,
data={arg : arguments })
return r eque s t . s t a tu s c od e != 200
# On Device code
def event ( dev ice type , event type , data ) :
. . .
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Figure 3.2: Example communication flows in a camera application, with associated man-
ifest and code to dictate communication shown in Listing 3.2 and 3.1. Red arrows show
external communication.
3.9 Scheduling
In order to ensure fairness and minimize the overhead of our caching algorithm, we use a
simple least recently used (LRU) caching strategy. To minimize latency, lambdas are cached
until a new request is received or if forcefully restarted due to becoming too tainted. These
lambdas, do not consume CPU resources, as these processes are always blocked waiting
for arguments which gives the PLOX service the ability to schedule lambdas as it sees
fit. When a new request is received, the manifest is checked to identify what the required
resources on the system will be (ie, memory, threads). The PLOX service then follows the
LRU algorithm to evict lambdas that currently not running from cache until enough space
is available. When lambdas are evicted, a special construction function is placed on the
specific event queues that the lambda wished to be notified about.
The event scheduling follows the exact same pattern. Placed into a queue, events are
executed and potentially evict lambdas if no space is currently available to execute. Once
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reaching the front of the queue, the lambdas subscribed to the event are executed. Physical
devices are notified on the channels currently connected with the PLOX service, allowing
them to execute whatever functions are defined in their libraries. Given the wide variety of
tasks that are offloaded, in the future it may be valuable to allow users to prioritize tasks.
This might allow for a higher degree of control over the specified scheduling algorithm, and
prevent large batch like workloads from blocking the short, higher priority tasks.
3.10 PLOX Security Policy
PLOX’s dynamic capability model mitigates overtainting issues in IFC and simplifies the
policy interface for users. Capabilities alone are insufficient as they are difficult for home
users to parse leading to overpermissioning. Furthermore, they lack the context of the user’s
preferences about data sensitivity. PLOX’s simplified IFC model relies on the capability
model to reduce tainting and data-agnostic attack vectors. Used together, a hybrid solution
solves the weaknesses of each by supporting the different needs of both developers and users.
3.10.1 PLOX Manifests
The PLOX manifest separates privileges based on the individual functions an application
wishes to run. Listing 3.2 shows a simplified manifest from our PLOX-enabled IoT camera
device. Each top-level key in the manifest represents either the device, an external end-
point, or a function name in the provided code. This way PLOX separates the privileges of
internal functions and the privileges granted to external communication endpoints which
require approval/trust by the user to access the home network.
Inside each object the developer lists the permissions required for full functionality.
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dev i c e {
pub l i sh [ n o t i f i c a t i o n / f a c e ]
s ub s c r i b e [ camera/move ]
}
n o t i f y {
s ub s c r i b e [ camera/move ]
connect {
api . n o t i f i c a t i o n . com {
socke t {
f ami ly : AF INET
type : SOCK STREAM








r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s {
memory : 10MB,






api . camera . com {
pub l i sh [ camera/move ]
}
Listing 3.2: PLOX Manifest for our security camera application
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Devices list the events they can publish or subscribe to. External endpoints only accept
specified events restricting sensitive data flowing from an event to an external API. Func-
tions can specify resources (e.g. memory and CPU time), files, system calls they require
and connections to external resources (e.g. a notification API).
No direct communications between an IoT device and the outside world is allowed. All
sensitive data have to traverse a defined function. Furthermore, users will be presented
with a list of all required external resources to select the ones they trust with sensitive data.
The manifests can be automatically generated by PLOX under a developer ”yell” mode
which uses the PLOX interposition layer to capture all system calls and arguments invoked
within a lambda. To determine the minimal capabilities required to run the functions,
PLOX uses this captured data to map system calls and their arguments to a capability
within the manifest.
3.10.2 PLOX’s Sensitivity Label
PLOX users can associate a sensitivity label with each device joining the PLOX network.
This label uniquely tags the sensitivity of the data produced by the device and restricts
the functionality of lambdas that gain this label, restricting all forms of communication
to untrusted external endpoints. Similar to devices, external application endpoints can be
marked as trusted (by the users) to allow sensitive data to flow to them.
When a lambda is tainted by multiple labels, any endpoint it wishes to communicate
with needs to be approved to access all labels. If a label is missing, the data flow will be
prohibited. Sensitivity labels can be similarly added to all other objects on the network;
allowing PLOX services to interact with internal services in the network (e.g. databases
and network file systems) while enforcing IFC labeling. This results in PLOX tracking all
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sensitive sources data and restricting flows to only trusted external endpoints.
User Comprehension PLOX’s dynamic capability system presents two separate policy
descriptions allowing PLOX to use a fine granularity capability system without the pitfalls
of presenting this system to non-technical users. PLOX uses a minimal IFC policy to
avoid common problems associated with describing application capabilities to non-technical
users. PLOX’s user interface presents a simplified set of choices to users only requiring
them to label the sensitive sources of data (devices) in their home and the trusted sinks
(endpoints).
Through the IFC system, PLOX presents a risk style policy to its users which has been
shown to be more comprehensible in user studies [57]. For example, when a new device is
installed in the PLOX network, the system presents the user with the following question:
“Are you comfortable with any information produced by this device to leave the home?
Is this device sensitive to you?”
Further due to PLOX’s unique location on the home router and its running of lambda
sandboxes, PLOX has full context of how data is being used within the home allowing to
easily present policy decisions to the user when sensitive data is being accessed. In this way
PLOX shows what data could be possibly leaked to these endpoints using the risk category
placed on the device and the context in which the device is acting. For example, suppose
a security application wishes to send a notification to a user through a cloud service when
a face has been detected by a camera deemed sensitive to the user. The following question
is presented to the user:
“Application Face Detector wishes to use https://www.big-internet-company.com to
function, but has access to Camera-Bedroom’s sensitive data? Do you trust this website
with getting this data?”
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3.10.3 Dynamic Capability Model and the Serverless Model
Capability and IFC systems benefit from the a common use of a system call interposition
layer as both require context of the arguments and type of system calls being called; this
allows for capability systems to restrict the usage of these calls based of arguments passed
while IFC uses them to propagate taint tracking to objects within the system and restrict
the flow of data when needed.
PLOX uses a simplified IFC system that only tracks data produced by applications or
devices, unlike prior systems that require more complicated labels and track all forms of
communications. Systems like HiStar [68] use more sophisticated labeling schemes to bet-
ter restrict the action space of processes as they execute, however our simplification of this
system to only handle our sensitivity label can open this system to potential attack vec-
tors. By supplementing our IFC system with capabilities, we can bound the functionality
possible within these applications.
For example both capability and IFC systems interact closely with sockets. Capability
systems limit the remote endpoints that a functions can communicate with, while IFC
tracks connections and propagates IFC labels when connections are read or written to.
Connections that violate a can flow to relation will be stopped by revoking the underlying
capability. Socket handling is is explained more thoroughly in Section 3.7.
IFC requires the interposition layer to gain context on how system calls are used within
a lambda. These systems calls such as open, can be used as a way to gain access to sensitive
data, as such all functionality that could possibly taint a lambda must be accessible by
our IFC system.
The PLOX interposition layer copies system call arguments through an inter-process
communications (IPC) connection to the privileged PLOX daemon to avoid time-of-check
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to time-of-use (TOCTOU) attacks that often occur with system call interposition [39]. In-
specting arguments allows our system to to grant or revoke resources before any operation.
For example our ability to tie labels to the URL of a socket. This is a key feature at giving
our capabilities context, as now arguments themselves are objects within PLOX.
Short Lived Processes PLOX uses the serverless paradigm in two ways: Firstly, the
paradigm allows PLOX to easily restart lambdas once they become too tainted as these
functions are often shorted lived and stateless. Functions restarted in this way, lose access
to any sensitive data it could have accessed and taint is removed. Secondly it forces
developers to separate their application into smaller functions allowing PLOX to have a
finer grained manifest that can define the minimal functionality for each of these functions
as to properly enforce privilege separation.
Communication From the Cloud Much of the communication previously mentioned
addresses internal communication and how PLOX facilitates data flowing from the devices
throughout the home, but also to external endpoints. PLOX uses a separation of privilege
when handling external connections wishing to interact with internal devices. For example
suppose a user wishes to move a camera through one of their cloud services.
To handle this case, developers express through the manifest an endpoint to accept
requests and run associated functions within the PLOX environment. In the example
manifest of Listing 3.2, the application developer has separated the privileges between
the internal application of the ”camera” that runs the function ”block”, and the function
”move camera” that runs when a request is received through an external connection to
”api.camera.com”.
When data is required to leave the home, developers expose endpoints in which data
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can be sent through the associated application to this allowed endpoint. However, an
interface is required to allow external endpoints to interact with internal devices. For
example, a user may wish to notify a camera to turn or rotate from outside the network
from their cloud provider. PLOX disallows direct access to these devices, so to handle
this, developers express and register functions to the event system, and users are able to




We implement PLOX in ∼5200 lines of C++ on FreeBSD 12.1. We use FreeBSD’s Cap-
sicum capability system to implement the sandboxes.
Our evaluation aims to answer three primary questions.
• RQ1: Is PLOX effective in thwarting popular IoT attacks?
• RQ2: What is the performance impact and resource consumption of PLOX?
• RQ3: What is the overall overheard of PLOX?
Our experiments were conducted in a laboratory setting. We use a Raspberry Pi 3
Model B+ as the PLOX home router; The Raspberry Pi comes equipped with a quad
core Cortex-A53 1.4GHz ARMv8 CPU with 1 GiB RAM. We use another Raspberry Pi
for victim device prototype (See Section 4.1) and for the Home Assistant evaluation (see
Section 4.2). To simulate a malicious station, we used another identical Raspberry Pi. Our
evaluation shows that PLOX is effective in thwarting popular attacks in the IoT ecosystem.
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Our performance evaluation shows that PLOX functions are comparable in execution time
to Amazon Lambda and overall faster thanks to lower overhead and zero latency.
4.1 Effectiveness
To answer RQ1, we pick popular attacks in the IoT ecosystem and describe how PLOX
thwarts them in practice. The attacks are summarized in Table 4.1; Column two reports
the flaw exploited by the attackers, and column three shows that feature(s) provided by
PLOX to defend against it.
Network Isolation As shown in Table 2, PLOX’s network isolation is a key defense
mechanism for mitigating exploits due to default configurations and firmware bugs (CVE-
2015-2884, CVE-2019-12920, CVE-2018-8531, CVE-2020-7461). Adversaries outside PLOX’s
network cannot reach IoT devices within the network and must go through a triggered func-
tion in PLOX and only through an accepted endpoint – thus eliminating the chance for
remote botnet exploitation. Attacks initiated and triggered within the PLOX network (e.g.,
a malicious app is deployed within an IoT device in PLOX) can be similarly thwarted; Any
attack that requires to connect dynamically to different endpoints (e.g., email spamming)
would require an update to the manifest, notifying the user again of this change.
To demonstrate how PLOX’s network isolation can defend practically against popular
attacks, we conducted a PoC attack on a secondary Raspberry Pi device (denoting our
target victim device): we performed the following two experiments:
(1) We connected the target IoT device to our “Vanilla” IoT network (without deploying
PLOX), and further set up the device’s credentials to the manufacturer’s default one and
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configured it to be open to Telnet traffic. Next, we set up a “malicious” station outside of
the network that mimics the behavior of a Mirai botnet server; it sends TCP SYN probes to
the victim device (hardcoded), on the open Telnet port and then uses the default credentials
to login to the device.
(2) In the second experiment, we deployed PLOX on the network, and setup the target
IoT device to use the same configuration from experiment (1). As expected, the malicious
station could login into the IoT device in the Vanilla network. With PLOX enabled, the
server could not reach the victim device thanks to its network isolation feature. This
confirms the effectiveness of the isolation feature enforced by PLOX to thwart popular
botnet attacks.
Dynamic Capability Model As further shown in Table 4.1, PLOX’s dynamic capabil-
ity model defends against sensitive data leaks from the home network (e.g., CVE-2015-2884,
fish monitor attack [13]). Adversaries cannot send information obtained from an infected
IoT device like in the case of the fish monitor hack where an attacker infiltrated a casino’s
network through an overpermissioned and open fish monitor to access and leak sensitive
client information. In conjunction with its network isolation feature, PLOX’s dynamic
capability model defends against sophisticated variants of botnet attacks which would at-
tempt to deploy adversarial code. However, these botnets attacks require the ability to
connect freely to external connections which would be prohibited by the manifest.
To illustrate how PLOX’s dynamic capability model works to defend against informa-
tion leak, we develop a PoC attack that aims to steal camera data on the network. We
repeated our PoCs with and without enabling IFC in PLOX. Specifically, we performed
the following two experiments:
(1) We deployed an overpermissioned malicious camera lambda (as seen in Figure 3.2)
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on a target IoT device (a secondary Raspberry Pi device). The lambda subscribes to all
events within the network and communicates with an external malicious endpoint to leak
received event data (including sensitive camera data).
(2) In the second experiment, we enable IFC and set up the network identically to
(1). We further taint the camera data as ”sensitive” using our model. As expected,
the malicious endpoint could receive the camera events in the first experiment. With
IFC enabled, the malicious lambda could not send out tainted sensitive data; external
connections are dynamically disconnected thanks to the dynamic capability model – hence,
disallowing any sensitive data leak.
We note that PLOX would prevent more complex data leak scenarios, i.e., where two
(or more) devices co-operate to send out information. Device isolation prevents direct
inter-device communication forcing all communication through the PLOX event system
(which can be controlled and limited by the developer).
Exploited Public Endpoints PLOX cannot prevent the leakage of device data to an
exploited endpoint, explicitly trusted by the user (e.g., CVE-2015-2884). However, PLOX
does limit the sensitive data that can be leaked to the extent the endpoint has been trusted
with device data. If a lambda were to acquire sensitive data from a separate device that
the endpoint had not been given trust with, this would further taint the lambda past what
was trusted, causing PLOX to cut off external communication.
4.2 Performance
Figure 4.2 (b), (c) shows the overhead of the socket interposition. For the networking
component of the micro benchmark, we had three servers running. One server acted as a
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Attack Exploitation Defense
CVE-2015-2884 [7] Default Password Network Isolation
CVE-2015-2880 [6] Default Password Network Isolation
CVE-2019-12920 [16] Default Password Network Isolation
CVE-2018-8531 [14] Firmware Network Isolation
CVE-2020-7461 [10] Firmware Network Isolation
CVE-2020-11896 [23] Firmware Dynamic Capability Model
CVE-2020-11898 [19] Firmware Dynamic Capability Model
Mirai BotNet [11] Configuration Network Isolation, Dynamic Capability Model
CVE-2021-27561 [24] Configuration Network Isolation, Dynamic Capability Model
CVE-2021-27562 [25] Configuration Network Isolation, Dynamic Capability Model
Smart TV Botnet [5] Configuration Network Isolation, Dynamic Capability Model
CVE-2017-8867 [12] No Encryption Network Isolation, Dynamic Capability Model
CVE-2015-2884 [8] Endpoint Vulnerability Dynamic Capability Model
Fish Monitor Attack [13] Overpermissioning Dynamic Capability Model
Table 4.1: A list of attacks found through the IoT ecosystem, how they were exploited and
what part of PLOX protects against this attack.
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(a) Python Runtime (b) C++ Runtime (c) Overhead costs of Evaluated
Frameworks
Figure 4.1: This figure shows overall overhead from running a sample benchmark within
each of the three frameworks. Home Assistant was excluded from the C++ evaluation due
to the need to run the C++ code through its python interface.
sink for writes (similar to /dev/null). Another acted as a supplier of data by writing data
to any of its connected clients, allowing for the client to always be able to read from its
socket. The third server was a simple echo server allowing us to evaluate the full round trip
cost of a mock request. For each of the servers, we wrote and read in 4 KiB chunks as this
is far larger than most HTTP API GET requests that would be sent out, as these request
are usually limited by the maximum URL size specific browsers will support (2 KiB on
IE9 [29]).
We see that create and the meta-data operations in Figure 4.2 (c) are costly for PLOX
as these operations require many arguments. We consistently see that, as the number of
arguments or return values grow within a system call, the overhead for that call is increased
due to the increased cost of IPC between the PLOX lambda and PLOX runtime. These
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(a) File System Operations (4 kB)(b) Common Communication Oper-
ations (4 kB)
(c) Construction and Meta-Data Op-
erations
Figure 4.2: This figure shows a micro benchmark ran with and without (labeled Base) the
PLOX framework. We ran networking calls that talked to three separate servers, a write
server, a read server, and an echo server. We then measured time taken to do each of these
calls, with the echo server representing a realistic view of the overhead of a standard API
request that would be done by an IoT application.
functions are typically fast (10 µs) and the PLOX interposition turns these faster operations
into expensive read and write socket calls. These operations however are typically more
rare and sockets once fully constructed and connected will mainly be reading or writing.
The connect system call in Figure 4.2 (b) sees a much lower decrease in performance (5%)
as connect is a far more expensive call (3 ms) and the cost of argument passing becomes
less of a relative overhead.
Another pattern we see is the reduced cost for both read and write and increased
cost for the echo. This occurs because the process itself is not actually sending data to an







Table 4.2: Total round trip time of the C++ benchmark for PLOX and Amazon Lambda.
Cold start up is defined after PLOX has retrieved both the manifest and code from the
device. These artifacts are retrieved during the initial handshake with a device so should
always be on disk. The cost of cold start up is initial setup of the C++ runtime and the
forking of the lambda process.
the write and read stay completely within the OS, never needing to interact with a device
like the network interface.
The true cost of piping occurs with interactions with the echo server, as once the process
is expecting a response an overhead is seen. This overhead is due to data having to be read
from the PLOX runtime end of the socket pair and written to the real connected socket.
The PLOX lambda must wait for these actions to occur, but also wait on the polling thread
to wake-up and read the data from the other end of its pipe.
In Figure 4.2(a) we ran a simple read/write file benchmark on FFS. The benchmark
wrote to a file in a 4 KiB chunk using random data (from /dev/urandom). We synced the
file to force the writes to the disk then read back the written chunks. Our main objective is
to reduce cache jitter that can occur when doing these file operations and properly evaluate
our open system call interposition, while showing Capsicums zero overhead for standard
file reads and writes. The open system call requires minimal arguments, so the message
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passing overhead is minimal. We see no overhead with Capsicum, as minimal time is taken
to check the Capsicum rights struct that is apart of every kernel file object.
Amazon Lambda and Home Assistant In Figure 4.1 we compare against two frame-
works used for IoT – Amazon Lambda (with default configuration) and Home Assistant.
We compare against Amazon Lambda in both our C++ and Python runtime, but due
to Home Assistant being built in Python, there was no way for us to call C++ libraries
without first going through Python itself which would be an unfair comparison.
For our benchmark we had the process first create a socket, connect to an external
service (in this case www.google.com), make a simple GET request, and wait for the
response. It would then format the timing data for each call into a JSON object to be
returned to the user. For PLOX, we setup two devices on the local network, one device
being the Raspberry Pi which ran PLOX, and another desktop acting as the client.
For Amazon, we setup the Lambda to be triggered using their API-Gateway as we
found this to be the fastest trigger. Using the AWS command line interface (CLI) to
trigger functions had a substantial overhead due authentication and the CLI itself. We
used CURL to send a GET request to this API endpoint and had curl output the round
trip time for this request.
In order to test the connection between devices in Home Assistant, we use the event
bus and built two custom components. The first component was responsible for logging
the start time of the test, then firing an event to start up the second component. Upon
this event firing, the benchmark would execute on the second component and log timings
to home assistant. When the benchmark finished, it sent out a done event back to the first
component. The first component then logged a timestamp. We used these timestamps to
measure the round trip for this benchmark.
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Figure 4.1 (a) we see calls within Home Assistant being highly volatile and more expen-
sive than both PLOX and Amazon Lambda. This volatility is likely from the networking
layer that Home Assistant uses. Home Assistant is bulkier due to its implementation
within Python, leading to larger overheads. This can be seen in every function call and
contributes to higher volatility and a higher overall round-trip cost for Home Assistant.
In Figure 4.1 (c), we see a breakdown of the overhead cost of each framework. To
measure overhead cost we took the average round trip time of warmed functions, and
subtracted total function time and latency. Both PLOX and Home Assistant latency’s
were negligible (<1 ms) so we considered this to be 0. We see PLOX is running 5 times
faster than Amazon, this is from two areas: latency and Amazon’s need for isolated scaling.
Amazon’s framework requires the dispatching of millions of functions to hundreds of
servers within the data centre. Amazon Lambda has higher than normal costs as users
need kernel space isolation to eliminate users from peeking at other user workloads [27].
This framework overhead is close to 150 ms. Although these features are important, we
believe features like auto-scaling and kernel space isolation are less useful within the home
IoT environment.
The advantage of Amazon lambda is that this overhead is not on IoT devices themselves,
but note that Amazon’s functions were running only 5-10% faster then on the Raspberry
Pi showing that resources given to these functions are quite limited. In Table 4.2 we
see a look at our C++ benchmark in relation to cold starts. This outlines the cost for
infrequent requests which is reduced by the use of PLOX due to not having to start up
bulkier virtual machines. PLOX has over a 700 ms advantage in terms of latency when




In this chapter, I will outline the directions we are taking PLOX, including some notable
future research directions that could be pursued outside of this project.
At this time, a number of smart applications have been prototyped on PLOX. These
are a small number of the required applications needed to test the robustness of PLOX.
Furthermore, continued testing of a large scale deployment of PLOX may help to sup-
port the overtainting prevention claims, and highlight the stability of the framework as a
reasonable solution for the smart home.
Qualitatively, both developers that have worked directly on PLOX smart applications
have strongly preferred the development experience over other frameworks. While both
developers have also designed PLOX, the manifest auditing tool, as well as the simple APIs,
made building smart applications on PLOX much faster and easier than on other tested
platforms, including Home Assistant, Amazon Lambda, and Azure IoT Edge. Though this
is not a central goal of the project, developer experience may be worth exploring through a
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user study or qualitative comparison of smart application implementations. An exploration
into more complicated application deployments may also help compare the simplicity and
complexity of these frameworks through analysis of the required lines of code and required
configuration files.
A user study targeting smart home users could also provide more context into if the taint
labeling system is intuitive. Although it has been shown that user context is essential in the
smart home [49, 51], a comparison to other smart hubs or smart home frameworks could
improve the design of PLOX, and help build an understanding of how misconfiguration
happens within the smart home. Further research into this area could also help to improve
the design of other frameworks.
Another interesting design direction for PLOX is remote patching of devices. Given the
strong network segmentation and device isolation PLOX imposes, updating and controlling
the firmware of physical devices is a logical extension of PLOX. This would further the
completeness of PLOX as a solution for the smart home.
Another consideration to better allow PLOX to solve the security concerns of the smart
home is the usage of role based taint labeling. Currently, PLOX does not support user roles
beyond the administrator or trusted devices, sensitive applications and normal applications.
By exploring guest labels, or allowing users to mark devices are accessible to a variety of
user groups, a number of privacy concerns could be addressed. It could also help support
the arguments found in research by [70] that smart homes with multi user environments
require further options to prevent kids or guests from accessing sensitive or critical home
functionality. This could also be a strong direction for future research, given the simplicity
of configurations required by users and natural extension of data controls within the smart
home.
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Finally, PLOX could be extended to leverage mesh networks. Given the already dis-
tributed and concurrent nature of PLOX, using multiple nodes of computation within the
smart home is a natural extension. By increasing the number of compute nodes, the home
would become much less prone to failure. In the current deployment, there is a single point
of failure, leading to a strong incentive for attackers to compromise the device. This redun-
dancy would also allow for tasks to be scheduled between computation nodes, potentially
increasing the types of tasks that could be performed by PLOX. Dynamic scheduling could
be further investigated to account for the variety of task sizes that may be best scheduled
between PLOX instances.
5.1 Limitations
Limitations on the Developer There are inherent engineering roadblocks that may
make PLOX difficult to adopt. PLOX may limit the agency of developers due to our strict
usage of an event system for inter-device communication and our usage of the serverless
paradigm. While this limitation could impact secondary functionalities provided by the
devices, it should not interfere with its main functionality.
Central Point of Computation PLOX uses the router as its only point of computation.
Given the increased risk of PLOX being deployed on the home router, attackers would be
heavily incentivised to exploit any security vulnerabilities found within the router or PLOX
to disrupt the home network. This increased reliance on the router may lead to a larger
draw to exploit said vulnerabilities.
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Removing Device Taint PLOX lacks the ability to untaint devices themselves. Once a
device becomes tainted by receiving an event from a sensitive device (rather than through
an associated function), PLOX cannot safely deem a device untainted as this would require
the ability to wipe devices. As such we cannot guarantee data is not being saved to the
device itself. This is an issue outlined by OWASP as a lack of physical hardening on the





This paper presents PLOX, a framework that provides a serverless function program-
ming environment for IoT device developers. PLOX introduces the dynamic capability
model, combining a fine grain capability system (FreeBSD’s Capcisum) and a simplified
IFC model. This combined model addresses the weaknesses of both capability systems and
IFC.
PLOX uses a serverless paradigm to allow for the separation of privileges between each
of the functions that make up an IoT application. PLOX is able to provide greater context
to policy divisions due to facilitating safe sandboxes for third party applications and its
placement on the home router, which allows for it to fully isolate devices on the network.
In our evaluation we showed how PLOX can defend against varying exploits and vul-
nerabilities within the IoT ecosystem such as Botnets which exploit default configurations
and old firmware. We also evaluate PLOX’s ability to protect sensitive user data through
the use of an adversarial application. Finally, PLOX outperformed both a cloud solution,
Amazon Lambda and an open source smart hub solution, Home Assistant.
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